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ABSTRACT:
This Comment explores several interesting legal questions regarding the proper interpretation
42 U.S.C. Section 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in contracting, when
discrimination arises in the context of a consumer retail contract. It explores how the Fifth
Circuit’s and other federal courts’ narrow interpretation of section 1981’s application in a retail
setting, which allows plaintiffs to invoke the statute only when they have been prevented from
completing their purchase, is contrary to the statute’s express language, Congressional intent,
and to evolving concepts of contract theory, all of which encompass our society’s deep
commitment to combating racial discrimination through strict enforcement of civil rights
protections. It examines the legislative and interpretive history of 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
emphasizing the trend in both Congress and the courts to interpret this and other civil rights laws
broadly.
It then reviews a selection of federal court interpretations of § 1981’s application to the retail
setting, from the very restrictive to those that have found a workable, broader interpretation that
encompasses the various stages of the retailer-consumer contractual relationship. It highlights
the standard adopted in the Sixth Circuit that finds actionable “markedly hostile” discriminatory
conduct affecting the contractual relationship. Finally, the Comment examines how, as contract
theory itself evolves to encompass a more expansive view of responsibility and liability between
contracting parties, so should the non-discrimination statute which governs contractual relations.
In conclusion, an adoption of the Sixth Circuit’s “markedly hostile” test is urged.
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I.

Introduction
On March 26, 1995, Denise Arguello and her family stopped at a Conoco gas station in

Forth Worth, Texas on their way to a family picnic.1 She approached the counter with her items
and attempted to pay for them with a credit card. The sales clerk, Cindy Smith, was instantly
rude.2 She requested Ms. Arguello’s identification, and when Ms. Arguello provided her out of
state driver’s license, Ms. Smith stated that it was Conoco policy not to accept out of state
licenses as valid forms of identification.3 An argument ensued, after which Ms. Smith accepted
the credit card and completed the transaction.4
After Ms. Arguello paid for her purchase, the tension between Ms. Smith and Ms.
Arguello escalated into an altercation, during which Ms. Smith called Ms. Arguello a “f**king
Iranian Mexican bitch.”5 After Ms. Arguello exited the store, Ms. Smith continued her verbal
assault on Ms. Arguello by screaming racial epithets on the gas station’s intercom, which
broadcast in the store’s parking lot. She also laughed at and made several crude gestures toward
Ms. Arguello and her family, who was waiting in the car.6

1

Arguello v. Conoco, No. 397CV0638-H, 2001 WL 1442340, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2001).

2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id. (Ms. Arguello is Hispanic).

6

Id.
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Ms. Arguello brought a 42 U.S.C. § 19817 claim against Conoco, alleging that the
discriminatory and abusive treatment that she received during this encounter deprived her of the
right to contract on the same terms as white customers, in violation of § 1981.8 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided that Ms. Arguello did not have a cognizable section 1981 claim
because she was not prevented from making her purchases, despite the “offensive” and
“egregious” conduct to which she was subjected.9 The U.S. Supreme Court denied Ms.
Arguello’s petition for writ of certiorari.10
Ms. Arguello’s case presents several interesting legal questions regarding the proper
interpretation of a Reconstruction era civil rights statute that is of vital importance to this
country’s civil rights jurisprudence. This Comment explores how the Fifth Circuit’s and other
7

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) (“(a) All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have

the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. (b) For purposes of this
section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the making, performance, modification,
and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions
of the contractual relationship.”).
8

Arguello, 2001 WL 1442340, at *2. Ms. Arguello’s father, Mr. Govea, who was in the store at

the time of this incident, also brought an unsuccessful section 1981 claim as part of the same
suit. Id. This Comment will explore only the merits of Ms. Arguello’s claim.
9

Arguello v. Conoco, 330 F.3d 355, 362 (5th Cir. 2003).

10

Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 540 U.S. 1035 (Nov 17, 2003) (NO. 03-342).
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federal courts’ narrow interpretation of section 1981’s application in a retail setting, which
allows plaintiffs to invoke the statute only when they have been prevented from completing their
purchase, is contrary to the statute’s express language, Congressional intent, and to evolving
concepts of contract theory, all of which encompass our society’s deep commitment to
combating racial discrimination through strict enforcement of civil rights protections. Part II of
this Comment examines the legislative and interpretive history of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, emphasizing
the trend in both Congress and the courts to interpret this and other civil rights laws broadly.
Part III reviews a selection of federal court interpretations of § 1981’s application to the retail
setting. Part III(A) considers several district and circuit court cases, such as Arguello, which
have adopted a narrow and restrictive interpretation of section 1981. Part III(B) reviews
decisions that have found a workable, broader interpretation that encompasses the various stages
of the retailer-consumer contractual relationship, and highlights the standard adopted in the Sixth
Circuit that finds actionable “markedly hostile” discriminatory conduct affecting the contractual
relationship. Part IV examines how, as contract theory itself evolves to encompass a more
expansive view of responsibility and liability between contracting parties, so should the nondiscrimination statute which governs contractual relations. Part V concludes with general
recommendations to the courts on how best to incorporate the language and intent of section
1981 in a retail setting, specifically encouraging universal adoption of the Sixth Circuit’s
“markedly hostile” test.

5
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II.

Legislative and Interpretive History of Section 1981
The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was passed in 1865 to abolish the

institution of slavery.11 It states: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to its jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.”12 In response to the end of the Civil War and the ratification
of the Thirteenth Amendment, many Southern states passed laws that became known as the
Black Codes. The purpose of the Black Codes was to deprive freed slaves of many of the
promises of their newly granted freedom.13 In reviewing the history preceding the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court, in the Slaughter House Cases, observed that the
Black Codes, along with other extra-legal methods of discrimination, “saddled Negroes with
onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their rights . . . to such an extent that their
freedom was of little value.”14
The Slaughter House Cases brought before the Supreme Court the question of whether
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the state of Louisiana from creating a statesanctioned monopoly in the slaughter house business in New Orleans.15 The Court reasoned that
Louisiana’s conduct, however unwise, was not unconstitutional because the intent of the
11

U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.

12

Id.

13

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 426 (1968) (reviewing the history of the times

preceding the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866). See also discussion infra pp. XX
14

The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70 (1872).

15

Id. at 49.
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Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments was primarily to abolish the institution of slavery and its
legacy, not to render unconstitutional legislative efforts to regulate economic activity.16 In
tracing the history and intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court discussed the practical
effect of the Black Codes, recalling that in some states former slaves were forbidden to enter
town unless as menial servants.17 They were required to live and work on land that they were
not allowed to buy; only certain occupations were available for former slaves to enter; and they
were not permitted to give testimony in the courts in any case where a white man was a party.18
It was said that “their lives were at the mercy of bad men, either because the laws for their
protection were insufficient or were not enforced.”19 Thus, the Slaughter-House Cases clarified
that the purposes of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments was essentially to
combat slavery’s legacy of discrimination, such as that embedded in the Black Codes.
In the same year Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment,20 it also passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, also in an effort to combat the Black Codes and other laws and practices
limiting the freedom guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment.21 The 1866 Act was passed
pursuant to Congress’s authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to pass laws to enforce the

16

Id. at 72.

17

Id. at 70.

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

The Fourteenth Amendment was passed by Congress in 1866, though not ratified until 1868.

U.S. CONST. Am. XIV (historical notes).
21

Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1809, 1861. See also Jones, 392 U.S. at 422-436.

7

Abby Morrow Richardson - Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Claims of Consumer Discrimination

abolition of the institution of slavery.22 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, now codified in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1982, granted all citizens “the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”23 The Act’s overarching purpose was to give
“real content to the freedom guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment.”24 The lofty aspirations
of the 1866 Act, however, were soon grounded by the Supreme Court.
In 1883, the Supreme Court heard a conglomeration of appeals known as The Civil Rights
Cases.25 The Civil Rights Cases challenged the constitutionality of the 1875 Civil Rights Act,
which forbade discrimination in places of public accommodation and provided criminal penalties
for those who denied to persons of color “the full enjoyment of any accommodations” covered
by the section.26 The Supreme Court decided in the Civil Rights Cases, even after conceding that
the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress the “power to pass all laws
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery,” that a refusal to
accommodate or to enter into a contract with another person because of their race could not “be

22

Jones, 392 U.S. at 433.

23

The original section 1 of the 1866 Act, now codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 (2000).

Excerpted in Jones, 392 U.S. at 422.
24

Jones, 322 U.S. at 433.

25

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

26

Id. at 9 (citing Act Cong. March 1, 1875, 18 Stat. 335).
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justly regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant . . . .”27 The
Court continued:
an act of refusal [to accommodate] has nothing to do with slavery or involuntary
servitude, and that if it is violative of any right of the party, his redress is to be
sought under the laws of the state . . . It would be running the slavery argument
into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person
may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will
take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal with in
other matters of intercourse or business.28
The Court distinguished between what it deemed were the prohibitions of state interference with
“fundamental rights” in the 1866 Act, of which it approved, and the 1875 Act’s attempt to
regulate “social rights” and private interactions between individual citizens, which it found
unacceptable.29 In conclusion, the Court asserted that because Congress had attempted to
regulate such “social rights” with the 1875 Civil Rights Act, it had exceeded its authority under
the Thirteenth Amendment, and therefore found the 1875 Act unconstitutional.30
As a result of the Civil Rights Cases, the 1875 Civil Rights Act was defunct, and the 1866
Civil Rights Act, which also ostensibly prohibited racially-motivated refusals to contract or
serve, was in many ways delegitimized.31 The Court had decided that such outright contract

27

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20, 24.

28

Id.

29

Id. at 25-28.

30

Id. at 25.

31

See e.g. Cynthia Gail Smith, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: New Limitations on an Old

Civil Rights Statute, 68 N.C. L. REV. 799, 809-10 (April 1990).
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discrimination was not illegal unless perpetrated by state law or custom.32 Individuals could
refuse to contract with each other – the state was only required to enforce the contract once
formed.33 This decision ushered in an era of restrictive reading of all civil rights laws, as well as
of Congress’s ability under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to pass legislation aimed
at eradicating “the badges and incidents” of slavery.34 Consequently, the goal of infusing of
“real content” into the freedom guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment, was severely and
suddenly halted.35 Segregationist laws were instituted, allowable because they simply restricted
the “social rights” of citizens,36 legally sanctioning second-class citizenship for minorities, and
were not successfully challenged until over eighty years later.37

32

Although the Court did not specify that its holding specifically affected the scope of the 1866,

its discussions of the nature of the 1866 Act versus the nature of the 1875 Act indicated its intent
clarify the reach of both enactments. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 16-25; see also Smith,
supra note 31 at 809-810. In addition, Justice Harlan, writing for the dissent, states that these
“badges and incidents of slavery,” which the majority misconstrued, “lie at the very foundation
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.” 109 U.S. at 35. Therefore there is little doubt that the
restrictive holding in this case was equally applicable to the 1866 Act.
33

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 16-17.

34

See Smith, supra note 31, at 809-10.

35

Id.

36

See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22.

37

See Smith, supra note 31, at 809-10.
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The Supreme Court returned to the issue of the Civil Rights Act of 1866’s applicability to
private conduct in 1968.38 Its decision in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co. revisited the legislative
history and intent of the 1866 Act and concluded that its prohibitions against discrimination
should, in fact, be applied to private conduct.39 The African-American Plaintiffs in Jones had
attempted to buy a home in a private subdivision in Missouri, and the Defendant had refused to
sell to them solely because of their race.40 The Plaintiffs claimed their 42 U.S.C. § 1982 rights

38

The Court had considered the provisions of the Act before in various cases. See, e.g., Shelley

v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (both holding that section
1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit state enforcement of racially restrictive covenants,
though as privately enforced the covenants are constitutional); City of Richmond v. Deans, 281
U.S. 704 (1930) (Ordinance prohibiting use as residence of building in block occupied mainly by
those with whom intermarriage is forbidden held invalid); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668
(1927) (municipal ordinance in New Orleans requiring racially segregated neighborhoods held
unconstitutional and in violation of section 1981); and Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
(Municipal ordinance forbidding person from occupying house in a block upon which a greater
number of houses are occupied by persons of the opposite race held invalid and in violation of
section 1981). All of these cases arose in the context of state-sanctioned or mandated
discrimination, not especially pertinent to our discussion here.
39

392 U.S. 409 (1968).

40

Id. at 412.
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had been violated.41 The Supreme Court acknowledged that when Congress passed the 1866
Civil Rights Act, it did so on the basic assumption that “it was approving a comprehensive
statute forbidding all racial discrimination affecting the basic civil rights enumerated in the
Act.”42 The plain language of the statute forbids discrimination by not only “state or local law,”
but also “custom or prejudice.”43 Therefore it was clear to the Jones Court that section 1 of the
1866 Act “was meant to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations of those rights enumerated in
the statute . . . ,”44 not just those embodied in the law. The Court further found that Congress
exercised proper power, granted to it by the Thirteenth Amendment’s Enabling Clause,45 in
forbidding private acts of racial discrimination in the 1866 Act.46
This decision was a direct reversal of the holding in the Civil Rights Cases, at least in
terms of its applicability to the 1866 Act. While Jones specifically interpreted what is now 42
41

42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000) (“All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every

State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property.”).
42
43
44

Jones, 392 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added).
See id. at 423-24.
Id. at 426. See Jones also for an extensive review of the legislative history of the Civil Rights

Act of 1866 and its drafters’ intent that its provisions apply to private conduct. Id. at 421-37.
45

U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. (“Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a

punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”).
46

Jones, 392 U.S. at 426.
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U.S.C § 1982, the provision granting equal property rights to all citizens,47 its legislative intent
and history have been held to be identical to that of 42 U.S.C § 1981, its sister statute.48 After
the Court thus clarified that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did apply to private acts of
discrimination, plaintiffs began to invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to remedy racially discriminatory
employment practices.

47

42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000) (“All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every

State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property.”).
48

See e.g. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431, 439-440 (1973)

(“The operative language of both s. 1981 and s. 1982 is traceable to the Act of April 9, 1866, .
31, s 1, 14 Stat. 27. In light of the historical interrelationship between s. 1981 and s. 1982, we see
no reason to construe these sections differently when applied, on these facts . . .”); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976) (stating that the holding in Jones “necessarily implied that
the portion of s. 1 of the 1866 Act present codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 likewise reaches purely
private acts of racial discrimination. . . The statutory holding in Jones was that the ‘(1866) Act
was designed to do just what its terms suggest: to prohibit all racial discrimination, whether or
not under color of law, with respect to the rights enumerate therein,’ . . . One of the ‘rights
enumerated’ in section 1 is ‘the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . .’”) ( internal
citations omitted); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 676 (1987) (“Both §§ 1981 and
1982 were derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866; their wording and their identical
legislative history have led the Court to construe them similarly.”).
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In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court repeatedly held that section 1981 affords a federal
remedy against racial discrimination in private employment.49 Additionally, it held that a private
school’s denial of admission to prospective students on the basis of their race was also a form of
illegal contract discrimination, proscribed by section 1981.50 These and other cases during the
1970s and 80s affirmed that section 1981’s protections reached various private acts of
discrimination, including those in a private employment context.51 The Court would next be
tasked with defining, within those contexts, what it meant to “make and enforce contracts.”
In Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., the Court attempted to define which rights were
protected by section 1981’s prohibition against discrimination in the making and enforcement of
contracts.52 In Goodman, at issue was which statute of limitations should apply to the plaintiffs’
section 1981 claim of racial discrimination in employment.53 The Court decided that states’
statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and not state statutes of limitations governing

49

See e.g. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (holding an individual may

bring claims of racial discrimination in employment under both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
50

Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).

51

The Supreme Court also established that section 1981 applied to contract discrimination based

on national origin discrimination (Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987)),
and to discrimination against white people, based on their race (McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)).
52

482 U.S. 656 (1987).

53

Id.
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interference with contractual relations, should apply.54 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Blackmun and Marshall, strongly disagreed and emphasized in his dissent section 1981’s
interrelation with contract rights.55 Explaining the scope of those contract rights, Justice
Brennan stated:
clearly, the ‘full and equal benefit’ and ‘punishment’ clauses guarantee numerous
rights other than equal treatment in the execution, administration, and the
enforcement of contracts. In this sense, § 1981 . . . is broadly concerned with
‘the equal status of every person. But § 1981 was primarily intended, and has
been most frequently utilized, to remedy injury to a narrower category of
contractual or economic rights.’56 [It] is apparent that the primary thrust of the
1866 Congress was the provision of equal rights and treatment in the matrix of
contractual and quasi-contractual relationships that form the economic sphere.57
Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall, therefore, recognized that section 1981
requires equal treatment for all citizens at all stages of economic transactions and
contractual relationships.58
The majority in Goodman also recognized section 1981’s broad scope, basing its
conclusion that section 1981 claims were more properly classified as tort actions on a
belief that tort claims encompassed the wider range of rights included in section 1981.59
The majority described section 1981 as a protection of the “personal right to engage in

54

Id. at 661-62.

55

Id. at 671 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

56

Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 277 (1985) (applying an

analogous analysis to 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (emphasis in original)).
57

Id. at 676 (emphasis added).

58

Goodman, 482 U.S. at 669.

59

Id. at 661.
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economically significant activity free from racially discriminatory interference."60 It is
noteworthy that the Court described the statute as creating the right to be free from
interference with economic activity, and not strictly a prohibition of racially-motivated
refusals to contract.
Following this series of decisions that incorporated an expanded view of the economic
rights and activities protected by section 1981, in 1989, the Supreme Court retreated to a
restrictive definition of the section’s use of the terms “make and enforce” contracts.61 In
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Court was faced with a challenge to its 1976 decision in
Runyon v. McCrary, which held that section 1981 prohibited racial discrimination in the making
and enforcing of private contracts.62 The plaintiff in Patterson alleged that her employer, the
McLean Credit Union, harassed her, failed to promote her and ultimately fired her because of her
race, in violation of section 1981.63 The Court considered whether the petitioner’s claim of
racial harassment in her employment was actionable under section 1981, and whether the Runyon
interpretation of section 1981 should be overruled.64

60

Id.

61

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).

62

Id.; Runyon, 427 U.S. 160 (a private school’s denial of admission to prospective students on

the basis of their race was also a form of illegal contract discrimination, proscribed by section
1981).
63

Patterson, 491 U.S. at 169.

64

Id. at 170-71.
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After reargument and reconsideration, the Court reaffirmed its decision in Runyon that §
1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts.65 It
stated that “Runyon is entirely consistent with our society’s deep commitment to the eradication
of discrimination based on a person’s race or the color of his or her skin.”66 However, despite
the asserted commitment to combat racial discrimination, the Court further held that section 1981
was not applicable to actions in which the actual “making” or “enforcing” of contracts was not
impaired.67 It found that, in the employment context, “postformation” conduct of the employer
affecting the terms of the contract, such as the “imposition of discriminatory working
conditions,” does not involve “the right to make a contract . . . .”68 It further reasoned that the
65

Id. at 171.

66

Id. at 174. The Court also cited many of its own proclamations which support this contention:

Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983) (“Every pronouncement of this
Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders attest a firm national policy to prohibit
racial segregation and discrimination”); Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The law regards man as man, and
takes no account of his ... color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the
land are involved"). Later in the opinion, the court states “The law now reflects society’s
consensus that discrimination based on the color of one’s skin is a profound wrong of tragic
dimension. Neither our words nor our decisions should be interpreted as signaling one inch of
retreat from Congress’s policy to forbid racial discrimination in the private, as well as the public,
sphere.” Id. at 188.
67

Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176.

68

Id. at 177.
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right to enforce a contract was only limited to “conduct by an employer which impairs an
employee’s ability to enforce through legal process his or her established contract rights.”69 The
petitioner’s claim of racial harassment, therefore, was held not to be actionable under section
1981.70
Congress responded to the Court’s narrow construction of one of the nation’s oldest and
most important civil rights statutes with the Civil Rights Act of 1991.71 The 1991 Act
specifically revised the wording of section 1981 to clarify that post-formation conduct in the
employment context would be covered by section 1981.72 Congress added sections (b) and (c) to
the provision, which now reads:
(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined
For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the
making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment

69

Id. at 177-78.

70

Id. at 178.

71

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).

72

Id.
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The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.73
Further, in the legislative history of the Act, Congress wrote: “H.R. 1, the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, has two primary purposes. The first is to respond to recent Supreme Court
decisions by restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited by those
decisions. The second is to strengthen existing protections and remedies available under
federal civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and adequate compensation
for victims of discrimination.”74 The 1991 Act, therefore, was a swift and complete
interment of the holding in Patterson v. McLean.

III.

Section 1981’s Application to Consumer Discrimination: Discrepancies
in Interpretation Among Federal Courts
Although the 1991 Act clarified that the “make and enforce” language of section

1981 applied to post contract formation conduct in an employment setting, the
application of the statute’s new language to consumer contract formations was less clear.
Consequently, courts are struggling with its proper interpretation. The courts are
wrestling with how exactly to define the parameters of the contractual relationship that
exists between a commercial establishment and its customers. Perhaps fearful of creating
a generalized cause of action for all instances of racial discrimination occurring anywhere
near a retail establishment, many courts have erred on the side of extreme caution.75

73

Id.

74

H.R. Rep. No. 40 (II), 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 1991, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 1991.

75

See discussion infra, s. III (A).
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These courts find that as long as the actual ability to purchase (and therefore complete the
contract) has not been prevented, section 1981 rights are not implicated.76
Unfortunately, the subtleties of today’s manifestations of racial discrimination
escape their model, as does redress for millions of American consumers who are
followed, harassed, verbally and physically assaulted, or simply required to endure
painfully substandard service so that they may be able to purchase their items.77
Other courts have endeavored to apply a broader understanding of § 1981 and its
protections to the retail context.78 These courts recognize that the imposition of
additional, discriminatory conditions into a purchase, such as requiring pre-payment or
subjecting customers to discriminatory behavior during the time surrounding their
purchase, whether before, during, or after, can interfere with the contractual rights
protected by section 1981.79
The latter line of decisions would appear to be in accord with section 1981’s
legislative and interpretive history indicating that it was meant to be read broadly in order
to combat “all racial discrimination affecting the basic civil rights enumerated in the
Act.”80 Additionally, these cases give fuller meaning to the 1991 amendment’s expanded

76
77

See discussion infra, s. III (A).
See generally Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 To

Cases of Consumer Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (2003).
78

See discussion infra, s. III (B).

79

See discussion infra, s. III (B).

80

Jones, 392 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added).
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definition of “make and enforce” contracts, which now expressly includes the “enjoyment
of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.”81

A. Courts Narrowly Interpreting Section 1981
Consumer discrimination cases that restrict causes of action under section 1981 to
those in which the purchase was actually thwarted restrictively interpret the language of
section 1981 and seemingly ignore the additional language of the 1991 amendment.82
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Arguello v. Conoco is an illustrative example.83 The court
in Arguello, citing section 1981, first stated that at issue in that case was “plaintiffs’
ability ‘to make and enforce contracts’ on nondiscriminatory terms.”84 The court decided
because Ms. Arguello “successfully completed the transaction” and “received all she was
entitled to under the retail-sales contract,” her claim must fail.85 The racial harassment
she encountered before, during and after the moment in time when payment exchanged
hands was not determined by this court to affect the benefits, terms, conditions or
privileges of that transaction. That “single, discrete transaction – the purchase of goods”
was the starting and ending point of the court’s analysis.86

81

42 U.S.C § 1981 (b) (2000).

82

42 U.S.C. 1981 (b-c) (2000), excerpted supra at p.16.

83

330 F.3d 355, 358-60 (5th Cir. 2003).

84

Id. at 358 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)).

85

Id. at 359.

86

Id. at 360.
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The Arguello court, in reaching this conclusion, relied heavily on the Fifth Circuit
decision in Morris v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, the Circuit’s first attempt to apply section
1981 in the retail context.87 In Dillard, the plaintiff filed a section 1981 claim against
Dillard Department Store after a security guard at the store followed her around while
shopping and to her car after she left the store, where he took down her license plate
number.88 The plaintiff then re-entered the store to confront the security guard about his
actions.89 At that point, the security guard handcuffed the plaintiff, had a female officer
search her, and then transported her to the police station where she was booked for
shoplifting.90 After this incident, the plaintiff was banned from entering the store for a
period of time.91
The Fifth Circuit Dillard court first reviewed the elements of a prima facie case of
§ 1981 discrimination that the Plaintiff Morris had to establish: “(1) that she is a member
of a racial minority; (2) that Dillard’s had intent to discriminate on the basis of race; and
(3) that the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the
statute, in this instance, the making and enforcement of a contract.”92 This three part test
87

277 F.3d 743, 752 (5th Cir. 2001).

88

Id. at 746.

89

Id.

90

Id. at 747.

91

Id. at 751.

92

Id. (citing Bellows v. Amoco Oil Co., 118 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying the cited

three-part test first adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Green v. State Bar of Texas, 27 F.3d 1083 (5th
Cir. 1994)).
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was adopted in Fifth Circuit in 199493 and, at that time, had also been used in the Second
Circuit and by a Florida district court.94
In applying part three of this test, the court considered the plaintiff’s claim that
the store’s decision to ban her shopping there for a specific period of time interfered with
her § 1981 right to be free from discrimination in contracting.95 The court disagreed with
the plaintiff and decided the ban did not interfere with her section 1981 rights.96
The court stated that there was “no evidence in the record indicating that she made any
tangible attempt . . . to enter any . . . contractual agreement with Dillard’s, at any time during the
course of the ban.”97 Therefore, her allegations of loss of contract rights were deemed “too
speculative to establish loss of any actual contractual interest owed to her by Dillard’s.”98 The
court concluded that “to raise a material issue of fact as to her § 1981 claim, Morris must offer
evidence of some tangible attempt to contract with Dillard's during the course of the ban, which
could give rise to a contractual duty between her and the merchant, and which was in some way
thwarted.”99
In reaching its conclusion that tangible efforts to contract must be actually thwarted by
93

Green, 27 F.3d at 1086.

94

Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp., 7 F.3d 1085 (2d Cir. 1993), cited in

Green, 27 F.3d at 1086; Baker v. McDonald's Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
95

Dillard, 277 F.3d at 752.

96

Id. at 753.

97

Id. at 752.

98

Id.

99

Id.
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the defendant in order to sustain a § 1981 claim, the Dillard court cited a series of decisions from
its own and other circuits that support the proposition that loss of speculative contract interests
do not interfere with § 1981 contract rights.100 The essence of this line of cases is that they
require plaintiffs to establish “the loss of an actual, not speculative or prospective, contract
interest.”101 These cases included the Seventh Circuit decision in Morris v. Office Max, Inc.,
which rejected a plaintiff's § 1981 claim asserting that a merchant interfered with his
"prospective contractual relations" where the plaintiff had completed a purchase prior to being
detained by police officers who suspected him of shoplifting, despite the fact that the plaintiff
was examining additional goods with intent to purchase at the time he was detained.102
The court also cited the Eighth Circuit’s Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., which
found that where a plaintiff purchased some beef jerky and was then arrested for concealing
other goods, the merchant "cannot be said to have deprived [the plaintiff] of any benefit of any
contractual relationship, as no such relationship existed" at the time of the arrest because
"nothing that happened after the sale created any further contractual duty on [the merchant's]
100

Id.

101

Id. at 751-52 (citing Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 853-55 (8th Cir.

2001); Hickerson v. Macy’s Dep’t Store at Esplanade Mall, No. CIV. A. 98-3170, 1999 WL
144461, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 1999); Bellows, 118 F.3d at 275 (denying recover under § 1981
to a plaintiff who failed to present any evidence that the defendant “did in fact interfere with the
contract”); Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1996); Phelps v. Wichita
Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of a § 1981 claim
where a plaintiff alleged “possible loss of future opportunities” to contract).
102

89 F.3d 411, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1996).
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part."103 The court also cited a Louisiana District Court decision, Hickerson v. Macy's Dep't
Store at Esplanade Mall, where a plaintiff was not "prevented from making a particular
purchase, or from returning [goods] he had previously bought" and thus the court granted
summary judgment in favor of a merchant because "[t]here is no generalized right under section
1981 to have access to opportunities to make prospective contracts.”104
The Dillard court contrasted what it deemed “prospective” contractual interests with
actual contractual interference by the merchant, which it deemed could properly give rise to a
cognizable § 1981 claim.105 For example, the court cites the Sixth Circuit decision in Christian
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., which held that a plaintiff, who had gathered her intended purchases
and was proceeding to check out when asked to leave the store, could bring a § 1981 for
interference with her right to contract.106 Another example the court references is Henderson v.
Jewel Food Stores, Inc., an Illinois district court case holding that "a § 1981 claim must allege
that the plaintiff was actually prevented, and not merely deterred, from making a purchase or
receiving service after attempting to do so," and finding a plaintiff's allegation sufficient to
sustain a § 1981 claim where the "plaintiff was midstream in the process of making a contract for

103

266 F.3d 851, 853-55 (8th Cir. 2001).

104

No. CIV. A. 98-3170, 1999 WL 144461, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar.16, 1999).

105

Dillard, 277 F.3d at 752.

106

252 F.3d 862, 874 (6th Cir. 2001). Interestingly, the Dillard court fails to mention the

Christian court’s adoption of the “markedly hostile” prima facie test for § 1981 claims that
would have allowed the plaintiff’s claim to proceed even if she had not been asked to leave the
store while en route to purchase her items. See id. at 872-73; see also discussion infra pp. 33-35.
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[a] goods purchase" at a cashier at the time an officer arrested him.107
Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Arguello and the cases on which it relies
illustrate these courts’ view that a section 1981 claim only lies where one physically
attempts to contract with a merchant and is physically restrained from doing so, either by
arrest or refusal to contract. These courts have determined that contractual rights accrue
only at the point money is exchanging hands, or when a customer is directly en route to
the purchase point. This narrow definition of § 1981’s “make and enforce contracts”
language does not attempt to incorporate the 1991 amendment’s expanded definition of
the phrase, which is now defined as “the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and
conditions of the contractual relationship,” into the retail context.108
In fact, none of the above-referenced decisions seem to seriously consider
Congress’s intent to broaden the protections of § 1981 with the 1991 Amendment.109 In
Youngblood, for example, the court stated that Congress had amended § 1981 to “include
the right to ‘the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship,’” but then decided that after the purchase was completed, no
contractual relationship remains.110 In Dillard, the court does not even reference the 1991
107

No. 96 C 3666, 1996 WL 617165, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Oct.23, 1996).

108

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a-b) (2000).

109

See generally Youngblood, 266 F.3d at 856-859 (Arnold, J., dissenting).

110

Youngblood, 266 F.3d at 854 (citing Lewis v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 367, 372

(D. Del. 1996) (holding that where plaintiff was detained and her bags searched after her
purchase was completed, there was no contractual relationship remaining between her and the
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amendment or its language regarding the contractual relationship in its application of §
1981.111 In Morris v. Office Max, the court cites the language of the amended § 1981 (b),
but then goes on to base its conclusion denying the § 1981 claim largely on preamendment precedent.112
These courts have failed to apply the broadened interpretation of § 1981,
mandated by the 1991 amendment, to the retail contract. They do not distinguish
between the discrete retail transaction and the benefits, terms, conditions, or privileges of
the contractual relationship. The contract and the contractual relationship seem to appear
to these courts as one in the same, an interpretation which would seem render the
additional language of the 1991 amendment - the entirety of section 1981 (b) - redundant
and unnecessary.

department store); Rogers v. Elliot, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (holding,
similarly, that even though plaintiff was verbally and physically assaulted by an employee while
in the store, because she had already paid for her purchases, there was no actionable § 1981
claim)).
111

Dillard, 277 F.3d at 751-52.

112

Office Max, 89 F.3d at 413 (citing, as the basis for its decision, cases where customers were

either refused service, Washington v. Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., 710 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D.
Cal.1988); Shen v. A & P Food Stores, No. 93 CV 1184(FB), 1995 WL 728416 (E.D. N.Y. Nov.
21, 1995); removed from the store, Flowers v. The TJX Companies, No. 91-CV-1339, 1994 WL
382515 (N.D. N.Y. July 15, 1994); or for a store practice of recording the race of all customers
paying by check, Roberts v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Mo.1991).

27

Abby Morrow Richardson - Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Claims of Consumer Discrimination

As courts wrestle with the applicability of § 1981 to the retail context, they should
re-examine what is, in fact, a contractual “relationship” in the retail setting, based on §
1981’s legislative and interpretive history, the intent of the 1991 amendment, and general
principles of contract law. These sources indicate that the conclusion is likely that the
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of a retail contract include a variety of
activities and cover a broader frame of time than a simple, momentary, exchange of
consideration. Retail shoppers enter stores, browse around, examine items, perhaps ask
employees for assistance, and finally proceed to pay for their items. Even after the
purchase is complete, the customer often has the option to return or exchange the items,
and thus the contractual relationship continues. Each step in this shopping experience
affects the final outcome: if, what, and how much the customer will purchase. It is also
during these pre-purchase activities that most discrimination is suffered.113 The entirety
of the retail experience deserves analysis and consideration in determining the parameters
of the retail contractual relationship -- its terms, privileges, conditions, and benefits. The
decisions discussed below illustrate a growing recognition of this expanded view of the
contractual relationship in the retail setting.
B. Moving Toward an Expanded Vision of Section 1981
Protections in the Commercial Context
A broader interpretation of § 1981’s applicability to the retail context has been
incorporated into the reasoning of several district courts in North Carolina, Kansas, New

113

See Harris, supra note 77.
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York, Illinois, and Ohio, and by the Third and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals.114 Unlike
the cases reviewed above, these courts do not require a denial of the right to contract in
order to invoke § 1981. Instead, they examine the facts to determine whether the terms of
the contractual relationship change with the race of the customer. For example, a Kansas
district court applied the same prima facie standard as used in the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits,115 but found that plaintiffs may state a claim of 1981 discrimination by showing
that their “contractual relationship” was burdened with additional conditions or treatment
that were not applied to dealings with white customers.116
The analysis, and the applicability of § 1981, in the cases below hinges on
whether the discriminatory treatment of the minority customers is determined to change
114

See e.g. Christian v. Wal-Mart, 252 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2001) ; Hall v. Pennsylvania State

Police, 570 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1978); Leach v. Heyman, 233 F. Supp. 2d 906 (N.D. Ohio 2002);
Kelly v. Bank Midwest, 161 F. Supp.2d 1248 (D. Kan. 2001); Joseph v. New York Yankees
Partnership, No. 00 Civ. 2275(SHS), 2000 WL 1559019 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2000); Hill v. Shell
Oil Company, 78 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Bobbitt v. Rage, 19 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D.
N.C. 1998).
115

See Kelly v. Bank Midwest, 161 F. Supp.2d 1248, 1255-57 (D. Kan. 2001) (employing the

prima facie test used in the Tenth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits: 1) the plaintiff is a member of a
protected class, 2) the defendant had the intent to discriminate on the basis of race, and 3) the
discrimination interfered with a protected activity as defined in § 1981); see also Bellows, 118
F.3d at 274 (employing the same prima facie test); Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413
(7th Cir.1996) (applying the test to a retail transaction).
116

Kelly, 161 F. Supp.2d at 1255-57.
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the terms and/or conditions of their contract with the commercial establishment. These
courts are stepping beyond the moment when consideration is exchanged in an attempt to
explore and define the parameters of the retail contract, and, in doing so, are paying
special attention to the additional language of the 1991 amendment, which requires
freedom from discrimination in contracting to include the “enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.”117 The courts
particularly focus on the “terms and conditions” of the relationship, and whether the
discriminatory treatment can be said to have altered these terms and conditions.
Some of the first cases to step in this direction arose within the context of a
restaurant service contract. For example, in Bobbitt v. Rage, the Western District of
North Carolina court held that the African-American plaintiffs had established a prima
facie section 1981 claim because although they were eventually served by the defendants’
restaurant, they, unlike the white customers eating there, were required to prepay for their
food.118 The court found that the prepay requirement altered “an essential term of the
customer/restaurateur contract because of race.”119 Consequently, the court found the
defendant had denied the plaintiffs of the “enjoyment of all . . . terms and conditions of
the contractual relationship” that were enjoyed by white customers.120 That the plaintiffs
had eventually been served did not change the court’s analysis.121
117

42 U.S.C § 1981 (b) (2000).

118

Bobbitt, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 518-19.

119

Id.

120

Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981).

121

See id.
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Additionally, a district court in New York found that when an African-American
woman was required to change clothes before entering a restaurant, when other white
patrons who were wearing similar or identical apparel were not asked to change, her
section 1981 contract rights were violated despite the fact that she ultimately received
service and completed her contract.122 That court clarified, “[I]mposing an additional
condition upon minority customers that is not imposed upon non-minorities states a
section 1981 claim for discrimination concerning the making and enforcing of contracts.
Where additional conditions are placed on minorities entering the contractual
relationship, those minorities have been denied the right to contract on the same terms
and conditions as is enjoyed by white citizens.”123
This reasoning is equally applicable in the retail context. In Hill v. Shell Oil
Company, for example, the Northern District of Illinois court held that requiring black
customers to prepay for their gas inserted an additional, discriminatory term in their retail
contract and therefore “directly implicat[ed] plaintiffs’ right to contract and to enjoy ‘all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.’” 124 The court
rejected the defendant’s assertion that because the contracts were completed that § 1981
did not apply.125 The court held that because the terms of the plaintiffs’ purchase were
different from those of white customers – the black plaintiffs were required to pre-pay
122

Joseph v. New York Yankees Partnership, No. 00 Civ. 2275(SHS), 2000 WL 1559019, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2000).
123

Id. at *4.

124

78 F. Supp. 2d 764, 778 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)).

125

Id. at 777-78.
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while white customers could pay after pumping their gas – that they sufficiently stated a
§ 1981 claim.126
The plaintiffs in Bobbitt, Joseph, and Hill were required to submit to conditions
not imposed on white customers in order to complete their contracts. The courts found,
even though the contract was not prevented, the additional conditions changed the terms
of their contracts on the basis of race, and therefore violated § 1981. These courts stepped
beyond an understanding of the commercial contract as an instantaneous exchange of
consideration, toward a realization that the consumer contract has terms and conditions
like any other contract. The terms and conditions identified by these courts included the
time of payment and requirements for entering the premises. When commercial
establishments changed these conditions on the basis of race, then § 1981 rights were
transgressed.
The question remained, however, as to when discriminatory treatment, as opposed
to altered terms, impacted the conditions of the contractual relationship described in §
1981. In Ms. Arguello’s case, for example, could the verbal assault she underwent
change the conditions or terms of her contractual relationship with the gas station?127
The following cases illustrate that discriminatory treatment can, indeed, impact the
conditions of the contractual relationship, and that the language of § 1981 clearly protects
minority customers from such discriminatory behavior.

126

Id. at 777.

127

Arguello, 2001 WL 1442340, at *1.
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One case that began to blur the line between discriminatory treatment and
discriminatory terms was Kelly v. Bank Midwest.128 In Kelly, the Kansas district court
reviewed the holdings in Bobbitt, Joseph, and Hill, and held that a bank customer who
was subjected to discriminatory treatment during the application for a loan stated a prima
facie case of § 1981 discrimination, despite the fact that the loan was eventually
granted.129 The plaintiff’s check was investigated to determine whether it was stolen; an
agent of the bank drove by the property identified on the plaintiff’s application to assess
the representation of it on the application; and the bank called the police for “assistance”
upon learning of what it considered suspicious information in the plaintiff’s
background.130
The court applied the reasoning of Bobbitt, Washington, and Joseph to determine
that the treatment of the plaintiff imposed additional terms and conditions on his contract
that were “less favorable than those enjoyed by white customers.”131 The court found the
bank’s alteration of these conditions was “the essence of a section 1981 claim” and
therefore denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment.132 Important in this analysis
is that the court identified as discriminatory the treatment of the plaintiff’s application,
rather than additional actions that the plaintiff might have been required to perform. This
treatment was the basis for the court’s affirmation of the § 1981 claim.
128

161 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (D. Kan. 2001).

129

Id. at 1257-58.

130

Id.

131

Id. at 1258.

132

Id.
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The recognition that discriminatory treatment can implicate the terms and
conditions of a contractual relationship and trigger § 1981 protections is not necessarily a
recent development. As long ago as 1978, long before the broadening language of the
1991 Civil Rights Act was added to section 1981, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that that a section 1981 claim lay in the implementation of a discriminatory picture-taking
policy in a bank.133 The bank, at the direction of the state police, had begun to
photograph all “suspicious black males or females” who entered the bank.134 The Court
of Appeals found that even though the plaintiff, a black male customer, was not
prevented from completing his transaction, because he was photographed during it his
section 1981 rights were implicated.135 The Court stated “Section 1981 obligates
commercial enterprises to extend the same treatment to contractual customers as is
enjoyed by white citizens.”136
In 1990, also prior to the amended version of § 1981, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals similarly found, in Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, “the fact that the
[plaintiffs] were never refused service in this case is not controlling.”137 This case
involved discrimination against African-American plaintiffs by a private social club
conducting a social gathering open to all invited guests.138 Even applying the restrictive
133

Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1978).

134

Id. at 88.

135

Id. at 92.

136

Id. (emphasis added).

137

915 F.2d 235, 243 (6th Cir. 1990).

138

Id. at 238.
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definition of “make and enforce” contracts promulgated by Patterson, the court found
that because at least one of the plaintiffs was asked to leave the premises, rather than
being refused service, they were denied “’the same right to make contracts . . . as is
enjoyed by white citizens.’”139 The plaintiffs were not forced to leave, nor was there an
outright refusal to contract. Nevertheless, the court found that the conduct of the
employees toward the plaintiffs effectively prevented them from contracting, and
therefore section 1981 contract rights were violated.140
The Hall, Watson, and Kelly courts found that that actual physical prevention of
the contract should not be required in order to state a § 1981 claim, and nor should the
imposition of additional affirmative requirements (such as the pre-pay requirement) be
essential to a finding of discriminatory conditions – discriminatory treatment can suffice.
This expanded understanding of § 1981’s protections was adopted by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 2001. In Christian v. Wal-Mart, the Court of Appeals announced a
new prima facie test of a § 1981 claim.141 The plaintiff, under the Christian rule, must
establish 1) that s/he is a member of a protected class; 2) that s/he “sought to make or
enforce a contract for services ordinarily provided by the defendant”; and 3) that s/he was
“denied the right to enter into or enjoy the benefits or privileges of the contractual
139

Id. at 243 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981).

140

Id.

141

Christian v. Wal-Mart, 252 F.3d 862, 868-69, 872-73 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the four-part

test used in the Second and Fifth Circuits and adopting that introduced in Callwood v. Dave and
Busters, 98 F. Supp. 2d 694, 705 (D. Md. 2000) (applying the prima facie test to a claim of racial
discrimination arising in the restaurant context).
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relationship” by either a) she was “deprived of services while similarly situated persons
outside the protected class were not” and/or b) “she received services in a markedly
hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively
discriminatory.”142 Thus, part 3(b) of this test explicitly recognizes that discriminatory
treatment can alter the terms, conditions, and privileges of the contractual relationship
protected by § 1981. This test moves the legal standard toward a truer application of the
intent of both the original § 1981 and its 1991 amendment.
“Racial animus can offend a customer equally whether he gets no service at all or
is served in a manner that marks him with the badge of slavery that the Civil Rights Acts
were enacted to remove.”143 So stated a Sixth Circuit district court in Leach v. Heyman,
applying the “markedly hostile” standard set forth in Christian v. Wal-Mart.144 The facts
in Leach closely mirrored those of Arguello.145 The plaintiff, an African-American
customer in a convenience store, brought his items to the counter and asked the retail
clerk for a pack of cigarettes.146 After a terse exchange of remarks during which the
plaintiff completed his purchase, the clerk began to should at him racial epithets.147 The
clerk then proceeded to jump over the counter and assault him.148 Although the plaintiff,
142

Id. at 872.

143

Leach v. Heyman, 233 F. Supp. 2d 906, 909 (N.D. Ohio 2002).

144

Id.; see also Christian, 252 F.3d 862.

145

Leach, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 908-09.

146

Id.

147

Id.

148

Id.
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just like Ms. Arguello, was able to complete his purchase, he was subjected to harassment
and conditions not imposed on the other non-minority customers in the store.149 The
court concluded that a jury could find that the clerk’s “treatment of plaintiff was
continuous, and manifested animus during the entire period that he was in the store,” and
therefore satisfied the elements of the prima facie case. 150
This result stands in stark contrast to the decisions in the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits which have stated both that any contractual relationship that once may have
existed ceases to exist after the purchase is complete, and that any discriminatory
treatment that does not prevent the purchase does not affect the contractual
relationship.151 This court found not only that the actions of the clerk after the purchase
was completed constituted illegal section 1981 discrimination, but also seems to imply
that the obvious animus affected this contractual relationship from the moment he entered
the store.152
The courts that restrictively read the scope of section 1981 to the exclusion of
both pre- and post- contract formation conduct in the retail setting were wary of creating
causes of action that are based on prospective contract interests.153 In Leach, however,
149

Id. (In the store at the same time was the plaintiff’s white companion.)

150

Id. at 910.

151

See, e.g., Arguello v. Conoco, 330 F.3d 355, 358-60 (5th Cir. 2003); Morris v. Office Max,

Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1996).
152

Leach, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 910.

153

See e.g. Dillard, 277 F.3d at 751-52 (requiring loss of “actual” contract interests, not those

that are “speculative” or “prospective); see also discussion supra s. III(A).
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the court carefully explained that not all instances of poor, slow, or substandard service
would support a section 1981 claim.154 By carefully observing the requirements of the
“markedly hostile” standard, courts can guard against opening the floodgates to an influx
of illegitimate racial discrimination claims invoking section 1981. The standard requires
that, in order to state a claim, a customer must either be denied services or receive
“services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would
find objectively discriminatory.”155 The objective standard weeds out behavior that does
not rise to a sufficient level to infer a discriminatory intent.
The standard also creates a flexibility that will necessarily adapt to different
commercial settings: the “services” one receives in a department store will differ from
those of a gas station. This adaptability moves toward a more generalized conception of
what the “contractual relationship” means in a commercial retail setting – it is one where
services are offered and tendered; not one where the entirety of the contract begins and
ends at the instant consideration changes hands. This conception of the retail contract
better incorporates the amended language of section 1981(b)’s definition of “make and
enforce contracts,” and offers a judicial remedy for victims of discrimination envisioned
154

Leach, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 910-11. The court compares its facts to those in several restaurant-

industry cases, where although the plaintiffs received rude, slow, or substandard service, the
service was not indicative of racial animus and therefore no § 1981 claim was stated: Lizardo v.
Denny’s, Inc., 270 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2001); Callwood v. Dave and Buster’s, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d
694, 706 (D. Md. 2000); Bobbitt by Bobbitt v. Rage, 19 F. Supp. 2d 512, 514 (W.D.N.C. 1998);
and Robertson v. Burger King, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 78, 81 (E.D. La. 1994).
155

Leach, 233 F. Supp. at 909.
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by the 1866 Civil Rights Act – one that “prohibit[s] all racially motivated deprivations of
those rights enumerated in the statute . . . ;”156 as well as one that protects the “personal
right to engage in economically significant activity free from racially discriminatory
interference.”157

IV.

Some Interpretive Guidance from Common Law Contract Theory
Section 1981 is a provision that governs contractual relations. As courts struggle

with how broadly or narrowly to apply its prohibition against racial discrimination in
retail contracting, guidance can be found not only in the statute’s legislative and
interpretive history, but also in the evolving common law of contracts. Section 1981
references the ability to “make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens.”158 It does not create a new federal contract right for minorities, rather it seeks
to level the contractual playing field; it aims to eliminate racial discrimination in the
contracting process, so that minorities and whites may contract on the same terms.159
Therefore, a look at the law that defines those terms is helpful.160

156

Jones, 392 U.S. 409.

157

Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661.

158

42 U.S.C. 1981 (b) (2000).

159

See Steven J. Burton, Racial Discrimination in Contract Performance: Patterson and a State

Law Alternative, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 431, 446 (1990).
160

See id.
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Classical contract theory, which emerged in the nineteenth century, was grounded
in the ideology of the freedom of contract.161 The ideals associated with freedom of
contract include an exaltation of laissez-faire capitalism, individual autonomy, and
freedom from state interference with economic activities.162 Each actor in a contractual
relationship dealt at her own risk: the bargaining, the agreement, and the duties and
consequences flowing therefrom were solely up to the parties. The terms of the contract
were only those explicitly defined within its four corners. Courts did not inquire into the
adequacy of consideration or the fairness of the bargain struck, and the parties therefore
were bound only by the law and terms of their contract.163 As a result, as Professor Ira
Nerken remarked in 1977, consumers were not protected from “harmful merchandise,
employees from harm, travelers from collision, or blacks from abject discrimination. The
law was too busy protecting the private actor to protect private individual victims from

161

See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 6 (1974); Comment: The Many Theories of

Contract, in Edward J. Murphy & Richard E. Speidel, Studies in Contract Law 88-89 (4th ed.
1991).
162

Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1012

(1985). See also discussion in Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and Improper
Considerations: A Common-Law Model for the Prohibition of Racial Discrimination in the
Contracting Process, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 191 (Jan. 1994).
163

See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 1.1, at 4 (1990).
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the antisocial byproducts of the actor’s activity. The law was too busy limiting social
duty to account for social costs.”164
As contract and social theory evolved, recognition of social duty and societal
interdependence crept into the jurisprudence of contracts.165 The modern neoclassical
contract model imports community standards of decency and fairness into contractual
obligations.166 These obligations insert themselves as implied terms of any contract.
While the freedom to contract still exists, it now exists within certain legal and moral
boundaries.167 Examples of some of the many common law contract developments that
form these boundaries include the doctrines of promissory estoppel, the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and the duty to serve.168
Promissory estoppel is an illustrative example of how contract theory has evolved
from a strict interpretation of the agreed-upon terms of the contract to one that
encompasses moral and social norms of what is just and fair. Promissory estoppel is
defined in Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: “A promise which the
164

Ira Nerken, A New Deal for the Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Challenging the

Doctrinal Bases of the Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
297, 332 (1977), quoted in Williams, supra note 162, at 194.
165

Williams, supra note 162, at 194.

166

Id.

167

Burton, supra note 159, at 447-48.

168

See Burton, supra note 159; Williams, supra note 162. Other relevant developments include

the recognition of unilateral mistake, unconscionability, and the lawful performance doctrine.
Burton, supra note 159, at 448-49.
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promisor should expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promise or a
third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”169 The foundation of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel is that community norms require that an individual be held
responsible for the foreseeable harm to another caused by her conduct.170 The theory of
promissory estoppel imports equitable estoppel, tort, and agency doctrines of personal
responsibility for misrepresentations that induce reliance and/or cause harm to another.171
Whereas classical contract theory emphasized consideration as the hallmark of the
contract – the bargained-for exchange, promissory estoppel allows a contract and its term
to be implied from the circumstances, without a meeting of the minds and with no
delineated terms for which consideration is offered and accepted.172 Some have called
the promissory estoppel theory that of a “quasi-contract,” a “contract implied in law,” or
even “a legal fiction necessary to promote the ends of justice.”173 Nevertheless,
promissory estoppel has become widely accepted as a basic tenet of modern contract
law.174

169

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1) (1981).

170

Williams, supra note 162, at 195 (citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH. FARNSWORTH ON

CONTRACTS, 2.19, at 146-47 (1990)).
171

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1), cmt. (1981).

172

Gilmore, supra note 161, at 76.

173

Id. at 73-74.

174

Williams, supra note 162, at 195 (citing Farnsworth, supra note 163).

42

Abby Morrow Richardson - Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Claims of Consumer Discrimination

The duty of good faith and fair dealing is another tenet of modern contract law
which imports implicit terms and conditions into a contract. Although classical contract
theory was loathe to recognize a generalized duty to act in good faith,175 good faith in
contracting is now required by the Uniform Commercial Code,176 the Restatement of
Contracts,177 and a majority of the states.178 The Second Restatement of Contracts states
in section 205: “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”179 Although good faith is not
specifically defined by the Restatement, the Comments to section 205 indicate that it is
generally a prohibition against bad-faith behavior, as defined by community standards of
fairness and decency.180 Good faith requires adherence to an agreed common purpose,

175

Eric M. Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good-Faith Disclosure in

Contract Formation, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 381, 384 (1978). See also Robert S. Adler and Richard
A. Mann, Good Faith: A New Look at an Old Doctrine, 28 AKRON L. REV. 31, 42 (1994).
176

U.C.C. § 1-203 (1992).

177

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).

178

Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith,

94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 369 & n.1 (1980).
179

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).

180

Id. at cmt. a. See also Williams, supra note 162, at 206; Adler and Mann, supra note 175, at

44; Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 262 (1968).
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consistency with the justified expectations of the other party,181 and according to the
UCC, “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”182 Therefore, the
expectations of the parties that the other will act in good faith are protected by contract
law, even though this term is not written explicitly into their contract.
The duty to serve doctrine is yet another tenet of contract law that places
obligations on the contracting parties that may not be written into the four corners of the
contract.183 The duty to serve doctrine is not in itself a recent jurisprudential
development. Its origins date back to the fifteenth century, when English business,
whether by holding a monopoly on a particular service or by holding itself as open to the
general public, such as a common carrier or inn, was required by contract law to serve all
unless a reasonable reason existed not to do so.184
The duty to serve doctrine in early American jurisprudence was implemented
through an analysis of whether the business in question was one considered “public.”185
These included innkeepers and common carriers such as railroads; restaurants, racetracks,
and places of amusement were considered private and not bound by the duty to serve.186
181

RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979). See also discussion in Adler and

Mann, supra note 175, at 43-44.
182

183

U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1992).
See Note, The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1993,

1995-96 (1989).
184

Id.

185

Id. at 96.

186

Id.
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Although essentially contrary to the revered concept of freedom of contract and,
therefore, the freedom to choose with whom one contracted, even in classical contract
theory there existed this obligation on certain service providers not to discriminate in the
terms or treatment of their customers.187 Recent American interpretations of the duty to
serve has expanded its reach to businesses that were once considered private, including
restaurants, gas stations, hospitals and home builders.188 Generally, the analysis focuses
on the extent to which the business holds itself out to serve the general public.189 This
expansion is consistent with the general evolution of contract law to impose obligations
of good faith, fair dealing, and faithfulness to justified expectations of the contracting
parties, discussed above.
The doctrines of promissory estoppel, the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and
the duty to serve illustrate the common law’s recognition of the totality of the contractual
relationship. The contract is not formed in a vacuum of social and moral obligation or
responsibility, and it does not consist of split-second moment in time when consideration
changes hands, even in the retail setting. Standards of morality, fairness, and decency are
always terms of the contract and are required for the duration of the contracting process.
Businesses open to the public often have pre-contract formation duties to their customers
not to discriminate against them. Contractual terms now incorporate many obligations
that may not be delineated in their language.

187

See id.

188

Id. at 1997-98.

189

Id. at 1998-99.
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It is troubling, therefore, that in light of the common law’s ever-expanding
definition of what a contract is and what its terms and responsibilities include, that many
federal courts would retreat to a narrow, restrictive reading of the civil rights statute that
governs contractual relationships. Ironically, common law’s almost mythic attachment to
the classical conception of the bargained-for contract is declining. The four corners of a
contract are dissolving as the duties and obligations of contracting parties become more
fluid, subjective, and dependent on context, norms, and ideals of social responsibility.
At the same, statutory civil rights protections, whose primary purpose is ostensibly to
eradicate all forms discrimination in the economic sphere, are being applied by some
courts using an extremely restrictive, narrow, and regressive definition of both the
contract and the contractual relationship surrounding it. Courts interpreting section 1981
in the retail context should follow the common law’s lead and recognize that no longer
can contracts or their obligations be so simply defined, particularly when the result is to
leave statutory rights without protection.

V.

Conclusion
Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of

contracts. The 1991 amendment to section 1981 clarified that the right to make and
enforce contracts includes making, performance, modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship.190 In a retail setting, the interpretation of section 1981
protections should necessarily allow causes of actions when customers have been
190

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (b) (2000).
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harassed, followed, verbally abused, or otherwise treated in a “markedly hostile” manner,
as well as when they refused or deprived of service. The legislative intent of section
1981, its various interpretations and applications by the Supreme Court, and the common
law evolution of contract theory itself all instruct that section 1981 should be broadly
construed so as to both deter and remedy consumer racial discrimination. The
discrepancies in the federal courts’ application of § 1981 to the consumer retail contract
should be eradicated and a uniform, broad standard, such as the Sixth Circuit’s “markedly
hostile” test, should be adopted. Only then will the purpose of the § 1981 be fully
realized.
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